



The political economy of an urban megaproject : Bus Rapid Transit in Tanzania
Matteo Rizzo (SOAS)
Torino, 16 Ottobre 2015


Transport chaos and BRT as the solution



BRTs : Background and definition

- Their growth:
- 2007: 40 BRT in the world
2014: 180
- What is a BRT?
“Think rail, (speed, reliability & mass ridership)
see bus!” (flexibility, much lower costs)
- BRT as the PPP in public transport

BRT and investment in infrastructure



Questioning “win-win” narratives on BRTs

1. How a plan reflecting particular interest is packaged as “the common good”
 - Vested interested behind this narrative
2. Distortion of policy goals: BRT silence on employment impact and domestic ownership
3. How DART is met and resisted by local interests in Dar es Salaam

Political economy of BRT, and threats/ opportunities for pre-existing actors?

- Context matters
- **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**
 - Who captures its long-term (guaranteed) revenue?
 - Who are the actors?
 - On what power do they draw?
 - Pre-existing institutions
 - Political status quo
 - Impact of BRT on political status quo

The BRT evangelical society



- The World Bank
 - International finance
- ITDP/Embarq
 - International finance
- Volvo
- “Propaganda like” evidence base behind BRT promotion
 - Bogota as a win-win story

The rationale and ideology (and silences) of DART

- Selling a “package” as the only (trouble free) solution
- Silences:
 - Fares tend to increase considerably
 - Quality levels not always up
 - Ownership of new bus companies tends to become concentrated in few hands
 - Foreign vs domestic ownership
 - Job losses and anti-union practices by BRT operators
 - Balance of power between private service provider and public regulator unbalanced
 - BRT = Public debt for private profit?
 - Two/three private companies to operate public transport with “invisible” subsidy from the public sector
 - Are there other solutions to public transport problems?

What causes DSM transport chaos?


Mode	Number of vehicles	Average Distance Travelled	Percentage	Number of person-trips per day
Dala Dalas	7000	10 km	61%	3,000,000
Walking (>500m)	-	2 km	26%	1,250,000
Passenger Cars	120,000	15 km	10%	500,000
Bicycles	200,000	5 km	1%	200,000
Motorcycles	30,000	10 km	1%	50,000
TOTAL	337,000		100%	5,000,000

Source: LOGIT Study for DART, 2006; updated by Schelling (2010)

DSM: Estimated number of person-trips per day per mode in 2010

Mode	Number of vehicles	Average Distance Travelled	Percentage	Number of person-trips per day
Dala Dalas	7000	10 km	61%	3,000,000
Walking (>500m)	-	2 km	26%	1,250,000
Passenger Cars	120,000	15 km	10%	500,000
Bicycles	200,000	5 km	1%	200,000
Motorcycles	30,000	10 km	1%	50,000
TOTAL	337,000		100%	5,000,000

Source: LOGIT Study for DART, 2006; updated by Schelling (2010)



The traffic jam is caused mainly by the 120,000 (and rapidly increasing) passenger cars which actually satisfy only 10% of transport demand

The politics of BRT in Dar es Salaam, 2002-2015

- Political economy of slow implementation of DART
 - 2002 Projected completion of phase I: 2005
 - Then in 2008, then in 2010, 2012, end of 2015?

How BRT came to Dar

- 2002 – The Institute for Transportation and Development Policy ([ITDP](#)) drafts a bus rapid transit proposal with the **Dar es Salaam City Council**, predicting it will be Africa's first bus rapid transit system
- Key features
 - 290m+ from World Bank
 - Phasing minibuses out of public transport
 - State of the art 150 seater bendy buses in

Causes of delay with BRT implementation

1. Proximate causes
2. Deeper causes

Deeper cause of delay with BRT

- All the previous constraints could be solved with high-level support/
POLITICAL WILL
- Deeper roots behind lack of support by the government
 - DART lack of attention to
 - Employment
 - Tanzanian transport investors (minibus owners)
- Tanzania president's
 - Public concerns about employment
 - Proximity to bus owners?
 - National vs foreign politics in Tanzania

BRT “made in Tanzania”

- DART lack of thoughts on local investors
Bus owners’ request for public support to access finance
VS
WB’s opposition to the idea
- The ‘re-birth’ of the UDA (formerly the urban public transport company) ...
... and its contribution/challenge to DART
- Stailmate April 2015: 90 percent of the construction ready and no DART buses ordered

BRT “made in Tanzania”

- A senior official in the Prime Minister’s office:
 - DART is “contending with two forces: one preferring foreign operators and another rooting for local transporters”.
- Interim compromise
 - Minibus owners to subcontract from UDA as BRT operators

CONCLUSION

1. How a plan reflecting particular interest is packaged as “the common good”
 - Learning from a context
2. Distortion of policy goals: BRT silence on employment and domestic ownership of public transport
 - Domestic politics of BRT
 - Nationalism vs foreign interests
3. How DART is met and resisted by a range of local actors
4. BRT as an opportunity?

The political economy of an urban megaproject: The Bus RapidTransport Project in Tanzania', *African Affairs*, 2015,

• <http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/12/22/afraf.adu084.full.pdf+html>